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III.
'PERSONAL JUSTICE.

And this just sense of right it is that in its exercise has
disclosed the third menace to which I have referred, the
menace of personal justice. This menace must arise where
we do not take special verdicts. The revision may sometimes
be influenced by a sense that the verdict, in affecting the
individual alone, works an intolerable injustice-not merely
an injustice, but an injustice that is intolerable. This
is the sense of one trained jurist, or of one and a few
associates: how can his sense or their sense find a thing
intolerable against the sense of twelve men who are the
established arbiters in the matter? and who by the theory
of our law are the people, called the country, to whose
arbitrament the dispute has been disclosed by the joint action
of the parties. And if it is allowed that this may be so,
will the course end in the subversion of the jury?
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The famous judgment of Vaughan, C. J., on this subject
is powerful. Bushell's case. Vaughan 135-6. The last
deliberate consideration of it has been by distinguished
jurists in this State, one of whom says, "It is not without
the greatest apprehension that I see this wide departure from
the settled law of this Commonwealth; it seems to me it
must end in jury trial rapidly falling into disuse; there will
then be eliminated from our judicial system one of the chief
elements of our strength, and one which has always had
the earnest support and warm attachment of the citizen.
Although there is some exaggeration there is much truth in
the declaration of the Englishman that, "The whole establishment of King, Lords and Commons, and all the laws and
statutes of the realm, have only one great object, and that
is to bring twelve men into a jury box." (Smith v. Times
Pub. Co., 178 Pa. 530.)
The spirit of our legislature has been assumed to favor a
restriction of the power of the jury to find a general verdict
in cases where in the judgment of an appellate court personal
injustice not to be tolerated ensues upon a disregard of the
weight of the evidence, and I will cite a statute which is said
to be confirmatory of this, although I must add that I do
not think it is to be feared, because it is unlikely that the
suggested legislative attack upon the jury will be effective
in courts of review. Yet not the less it may by some be regarded as an element of this third menace.
The statute was approved May 20, 1891, P. L. 91, IOI.
The second section is as follows: "The Supreme Court
shall have power in all cases to affirm, reverse, amend
or modify a judgment order or decree appealed from, and to
enter such judgment order or decree in the case as the Supreme Court may deem proper and just, without returning
the record for amendment or modification to the court below,
and may order a verdict and judgment to be set aside and a
new trial had."
It has not been doubted that the only passage to which
one may give attention is this, "and may order a verdict and
judgment to be set aside and a new trial had ;" and I myself
have little doubt that this passage merely expressed the law
as it then stood. You may find in our books a precedent
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for the Supreme Court's order that a new trial be had under
all circumstances within our Constitution. That it may so
order for error in law is the reason of its existence; that it
may so order because a verdict imposes excessive damages
has been shown in early -cases, one of which is interesting
because the Chief Justice in 1802 declared that a new trial
must be had, as the result under review was "against justice"
-a distinction looking at the menace I am now discussing,
for he did not find it against law. Woods v. Ingersoll, I
Binn. 149. And I think you can find a case in which it has
thus proceeded on the ground that the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence. In Lessee, etc., v. Cochran, I
Binn. 231, there was reviewed the action of a Justice at
Circuit who does not appear to have sat in banc when the
weight of the evidence was discussed, and Brackenridge, J., said that "the court might order a new
trial where the jury had found clearly against the
evidence." So also aid Duncan, J., in Sommer v.
Wilt, 4 S. & R. 26. These three were cases, however, at the argument of which in error the trial judges
were presumed (and in two instances the report shows) to
be present. It is true that in the last fifty years that court
has left the question of the allowance of damage to the court
below, and the R. R. v. Spicker, 105 Pa. St. I42, is an apt

illustration; and that in the last seventy-five years it has
refused to discuss the weight of the evidence, illustrations of
which are too numerous to be here cited. It has relied upon
the finding of the jury as conclusive when approved by the
trial court. Now, how has the Act of 1891 reached this state
of things? Has it conferred power? The question does not
appear to be worth discussion. If it has conferred power it
can only be with respect to a reversal of a verdict as against
the weight of the evidence, with respect to this exclusively;
and in such cases you must ask if it is unconstitutional. I
shall say a few words on this head. Is it unconstitutional as
impairing "trial by jury as heretofore"?
I would prefer to enforce briefly an unfriendly criticism
of this statute by a process that sets out from a principle of
law. The truth as shown by witnesses is not educed from
the testimony in chief, but largely from that and the cross-

68

THE THREE PRESENT MENACES: THE GENERAL ISSUE.

examination together. Nor is it alone from these two that
it is derived. The object of legitimate cross-examination is
to test the credibility of a witness, and it is always to show
that what he has said in chief is not credible, is either wholly
incredible, or must be taken after allowance made for certain
things which it has not brought to light, and which are
brought to light by the adverse inquisition. Unless an advocate has this object he does not cross-examine, or is an unskilled advocate if he does. It is an elementary sneer that
an examiner has only accredited the testimony which he
meant to discredit. Now, the value of cross-examination
does not lie alone in question and answer: it lies largely,
and often almost entirely, in the manner it discloses. The
principle of law I refer to is, that to the jury must be left
the question of the credibility of a witness. Therefore the
jury may wholly disregard answers making one way, if they
conclude, from the manner of delivery, that they are not to
be believed, and that, in truth, the fact was the other way, or
never arose as a fact at all. This function, according to
Pollock and Maitland, was an ancient element of the verdict,
and was what Bracton meant in speaking of the judgment
of the jury. Hist. of Common Law, 11, 625. Thus, you
see, a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence means that the jury have misjudged
the substance of things spoken and the manner of the speakers. It must mean this. And it must mean, therefore, that
a reviewing power having before it both of these thingsthat is to say, what was said, and how it was said, and giving
due effect to both, alone can validly discard a verdict. Such
a reviewing power is obviously the trial judge: and his
discretion must be exercised with circumspection. He rarely
sits alone, but has his colleagues as assessors upon questions
of law. justice Yeates thus regarded the situation in Comm.
v. Shepherd, 6 Binn. 288. His reversal of a verdict means
that, finding the tenor of the open and clear run of the oral
proof to be against the decision of the jury, he finds also
that there was nothing in the manner of the delivery as he
had it before him, just as it was before them at the trial,
to justify in law, under their oaths, a decision upon the
manner, that this run of oral proof was incredible. The

THE GENERAL VERDICT.

PERSONAL JUSTICE.

manner is as important a factor as the words in respect to
the credibility of witnesses. If this is so, can an appellate
court, to which the record carries the words only, decide, in
the absence of the other factor, that things said must be
taken as true even against the jury who did not credit them
because the circumstances of their saying had shown them
false? If this is so, no appellate court is bound by a verdict.
"And thus," in the language of Eunomus, "may the Constitution suffer by dropping a jury." Wynne II, 133.
Professor Thayer has said, "This institution, the jury,"
.

.

"has a peculiar interest for us, in the United States,

in being lodged beyond the reach of ordinary legislation in
our national and state constitutions." By the light of our
constitutional provision that trial by jury shall remain as
heretofore, we need not fear that the Act of 189i will be
held to warrant an appellate estimate of, and judgment upon,
the weight of the evidence, in a tribunal without means of
appreciating the foundation of a jury's judgment of credibility..
In this relation I refer to the case of Smith v. The Times
Pub. Co., 178 Pa. St. Reps. 481. We are in the way of
hearing of cases which are of vital importance in the advance of jurisprudence, no matter how slight their effect
upon the persons immediately involved, and I could name
several in the history of our court of last resort, but I do
not find it expedient in illustration of my subject to go beyond one of them. Carrolv. The R. R. Co., 2 Pennypacker,
159, may be pointed at as the most recent of this class, and
perhaps, the most important in the list, and as in the line of
that one which I propose to dwell on; but I must pass it for
the present. On the point referred to that case is a precedent.
Smith v. The Times Pub. Co. is also, as of course, a precedent, and on the points decided is supported by the authorities in England and by a line of precedents among ourselves.
I speak of this case because of its dicta. It is of great value
to the modern student because of its dicta, and as to these it
may perhaps be thought that they preponderate in favor of
the doctrine of personal justice, to be administered in cases
where the general verdict is disapproved by an appellate
court, that court being influenced by a sense that the verdict,
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in affecting the individual alone, works an intolerable injustice-not merely an injustice, but an injustice that is intolerable, and that it is likely would not have been incurred had
a special verdict been directed.
I shall refer only briefly to this case, and for the sole purpose of suggesting a line of investigation. The plaintiff
charged the defendant with the publication of a libel, and the
jury found for him and assessed the damages in an amount
so large as to have imposed, if finally sanctioned, an intolerable injustice upon the defendant alone, which the trial judge
and his associates in banc did sanction upon their review
on rule for new trial. The record carried to the Supreme
Court exhibited the testimony and papers offered, and one
bill of exceptions to a statement of the trial judge, but it
did not carry up the charge; so that, apart from the bill sealed
to the statement referred to, there was for examination only
the amount of the verdict in its relation to the entire volume
of proof. The Supreme Court held in effect that, every intendment favorable to the plaintiff being allowed from the
entire volume of proof, there was no warrant for the finding
of the amount, and it awarded a venire de novo, expressly
upon the ground that the finding was excessive.
But that court invoked the Act of 1891 as authority for
the procedure, and there arose a discussion of the constitutionality of that act, and a consideration of the danger of
entering upon the province of the jury. The danger contemplated was, that a general verdict, when found bad by an
appellate court, might lead to the graver peril of the administration of personal justice, of a remedy due to the hard
case in hand, and thus might be subverted in degree the
privileges and authority of the jury by the exercise of an
arbitrary power to remedy a jury's mistakes. Did the act
modify trial by jury as established at the adopting of the
Constitution?
It was the opinion of the court that it did not, because
trial by jury remained precisely as at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and therefore as heretofore. Said
the court, "All the authorities agree that the substantial
features which are to be 'as heretofere,' are the number
twelve, and the unanimity of the verdict. These cannot be
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altered, and the uniform result of the very numerous cases
growing out of legislative attempts to make juries of less
number, or to authorize less than the whole to render a verdict, is that as to all matters which were the subject of jury
trials at the date of the Constitution, the right which is to
remain inviolate is to a jury 'as heretofore' of twelve men
who shall render a unanimous verdict. Matters not at that
time entitled to jury trial, and matters arising under subsequent statutes prescribing a different proceeding, are not included. 'The constitutional provisions do not extend the
right, they only secure it in cases in which it was a matter of
right before. But in doing this they preserve the historical
jury of twelve men, with all its incidents.' Cooley Const.
Limitations, 5o4 (Ed. 189o), and see Black on Const Law,
451, and cases there cited."

.

.

.

"The Act of I89 i

makes no change in the trial itself, nor does it deny the right.
All that it does is to provide for another step between the
verdict and final judgment, of exactly the same nature and
the same effect as the long-established power of the lower
courts. The authority of the common pleas in the control
and revision of excessive verdicts through the means of new
trials was firmly settled in England before the foundationof this colony, and has always existed here without challenge
under any of our constitutions. It is a power to examine
the whole case on the law and the evidence, with a view to
securing a result not merely legal, but also not manifestly
against justice, a power exercised in pursuance of a sound
judicial discretion without which the jury system would be
a capricious and intolerable tyranny, which no people could
long endure. This court has had occasion more than once
recently to say that it was a power the courts ought to exercise unflinchingly. It has never been thought to be confined
to the judge who heard and saw the witnesses, but belongs
to the full court in banc, and was freely exercised by this
court when the judges sat separately for jury trials. See for
example, Somnmer v. Wilt, 4 S. & R. I9."
You will observe that the salient points here suggested are:
that the substantial features which are to be as heretofore
are the number twelve and the unanimity of the verdict;
that the Act of 1891 only provides for another step between
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the verdict and the judgment, that is, a review in an appellate court of the same effect as that in the court a member
of which tried the case; that the authority of the court a
member of which tried the case to review a verdict as excessive has always existed unchallenged; that this authority
"has never been thought to be confined to the judge who
heard and saw the witnesses, but belonged to the full court
in banc."
In this relation I have concluded to suggest to you these
propositions for investigation, each one of which may be
tested by the authorities.
I. Is the Act of 1891 idle, as a mere statement of subsisting judicial power? If it is not, it must be concluded that
it has relation only to verdicts against the weight of the
evidence, inasmuch as the authorities have universally sustained the appellate action of a superior court in other directions.
II. Are the number twelve and the unanimity of finding
the only indestructible characteristics of a jury? If so, the
inquiry may close here. If not, then you are to consider that
the investigation proceeds only with relation to questions of
the weight of evidence.
III. Is there a difference of function involved between
setting aside a verdict as excessive and setting aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence? My suggestion
in the course of this paper has been that there is such a
difference of function. Where a verdict is excessive the
error lies in the misapplication to facts found by a jury of
a rule of law as to the measure of damages.
IV. Do the precedents, dating from the abolition of the
attaint of the jury, warrant the action of an appellate court
of which the trial judge is not a member in setting aside a
verdict? In this relation we must disregard the English
precedents which are not subject to any restrictive constitutional limitations, and the precedents in our earlier reports
in which the Supreme Court reviewed cases tried by one of
its own justices, either in circuit or at nisi prius. The reason
for this is that by the theory of the law the trial judge always
sits with the court in banc upon the review of verdicts complained of.
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V. Assuming that in Pennsylvania the precedents at common law are against the action of an appellate court of which
the trial judge is not a member insetting aside a verdict as
against the weight of the evidence, may an act of the General
Assembly create and conafer such power within the purview
of the limitations of the State Constitution? May it enact,
in effect, that the presumptions of credibility and weight of
evidence drawn by a jury may be set aside by a stranger
tribunal?
VI. Is a statute constitutional which declares that an appellate court must (not may, but must) enter judgment upon
the facts as it finds them, and not upon the verdict of a jury
to whom both parties have submitted themselves for the finding of the facts? This is too serious a question to be lightly
passed over. if it is answered in the affirmative, it may be
apprehended that the principle which Burke correctly expressed some time ago no longer prevails, and that the peculiar feature of the law which has indicated safety and
health to the community at large is no longer to be discerned
in our jurisprudence. You will observe that in Nugent v.
Traction Co., 183 Pa. St. 142, the final judgment was for the
defendant as on a demurrer to evidence. The court did not
find the facts. "We apply," said the court, "the correct rule
of law to the established facts of the case." The correction
of a jury in matters of fact by a court, and not by another
jury, is contrary to a long-established principle. "If," says
Eunomus, "they judge apparently wrong, that judgment of
theirs may be corrected, but it will still be by another jury;
so that the injured party will not suffer for their wrong
judgment, as they might sometimes have done in the perilous
days of attaint, nor will the Constitution suffer by dropping
a jury." Wynne II, 133. And see II, 140, 3d edit.
VII. Could an act of Assembly prescribe that hereafter
juries were prohibited from drawing presumptions from
facts and regarding suspicions as to credibility, but must
find according to words spoken and the direct tenor of the
other proofs, whilst an appellate court might thus find and
also must as its exclusive function judge of the credibility of
the witnesses and draw deductionts from evidencef
VIII. Does the Act of 1891 require the Supreme Court
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upon record duly brought up to grant a new trial even where
a motion was not made for reasons filed according to rule in
the court below? This is not an idle question, and its affirmation would seem to follow upon a conclusion resulting
from your determination that the Act of 1891 affects questions of weight of evidence, and thus affecting them is constitutional.
These are questions of deep import, and they are not upon
a technical branch of the law; they are questions for a
statesman, having relation to the structure and life of the
system of jurisprudence itself and arising with significance
of danger in the future. They might have been the basis of
one of the profoundest arguments of Burke, and they may
well induce the writing of a great law book to-day. There
is as ready and promising an opportunity here as
there was for the work of Fearne, which did so much to
guard against error in the disposition of estates, which
indeed established the current of authority for years;
and the scope of the topic is greater here because not only
estates, but liberty, reputation, commercial advance, may be
found involved. There should be a quickening of the professional conscience as to the jury as an institution, and an
awakened interest in the very searching learning upon the
subject. More than this, there should be an influence opposing the trend of American legislation against the organic
law. For the creation of such influence the young men of
the day should by steady investigation in their leisure hours,
and careful thought, produce a sphere, an atmosphere as
some might call it, of culture, in which high tone is nurtured and invigorated, and in which only may the real import and essential value, the essential necessity, of our institutions be seen. I venture to recommend to you four authors
and some of the innumerable works which their citations
recommend to you, in this behalf: Francis Lieber, in his
chapter, Independence of the Jus:-Trial by Jury, to be
found in his Civil Liberty and Self-Government;-Hegel, in
his section of The Civic Community; of the Court; in his
Philosophy of Right; - Sir Francis Palgrave in his History
of Trial by Jury, an authority of some age now ;-and Professor Thayer in his Development of Trial by Jury, the latest
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great authority. The opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States, by Justice Gray, in Capital Traction Co. v.
Hof. 174, U. S. S. C. I, is valuable.
Are you aware of the extreme to which some of the new
states have gone in subverting the jury of the ancient-time?
And, on the other hand, of the show of fear of the judiciary
as a menace to the jury which two or more of the older states
make? The contest lies between the sovereignty and the
governed, and in one form or another is as old as government itself. The most interesting, because the farthest reaching exhibition of it, lies in the old English Statutes of Liveries and of Laborers. When the King found the people dangerous he sided wth the nobles in the Statutes of Laborers ;King and Lord against servitor and plebs; when he observed the nobles too powerful, he sided with the commons
in the Statutes of Liveries ;-King and plebs against Barons,
Earls, Dukes. When the pervading power with us has one
blind fear it strikes at the jury and enlarges judicial reach;
when the nightmare incantation stirs another blind fear,
the pervading power attacks the judges and puts the jury
above them. For illustration of this second form of panic,
let me refer you to the Dumb Act of Georgia of fifty years
ago. It was enacted on the 2Ist of February, 185 o , and pre-

scribed in substance that a trial judge should not charge
the jury as to what had or had not been shown by the evidence, or express an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of
one accused, and that if he did, his language, however accurate, should constitute reversible error. This, according
to the witticism of Chief Justice Bleckley, struck the judges
dumb. They became so anxious not to have an opinion on
the facts, and law and fact are usually so intermingled in
instructions, that they frequently failed even to express an
opinion on the law. (See Am. Law Rev., Sept.-Oct., I9OO.)
The illustrations of attacks upon the jury are so numerous
as -to justify a strong word. In Louisiana, except in cases
where the penalty is not necessarily imprisonment at hard
labor or death, the General Assembly may provide for the
trial by a jury less than twelve in number, and by the Act of
i88o nine out of twelve jurors may render a valid verdict in
civil cases. In Iowa the General Assembly may authorize
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trial by a jury of less number than twelve men in inferior
courts. The three-fourths rule prevails in Nevada, South
Dakota, Texas and Washington. Two-thirds may render a
verdict in Montana in all civil actions and in all criminal
cases not amounting to felony, whilst in Idaho in all cases
of misdemeanor five-sixths of the jury may render a verdict.
In Utah the trial of a felony less than murder by a jury of
eight men is legal under the Constitution.
It is interesting to consider that if we take the description of these three menaces to modern jurisprudence in its
darkest import, we yet preserve our content. When we appreciate the truths, that pleading is beyond the sphere of the
Law; that the finding of facts is no part of the Law; that
personal justice is abhorrent to the Law, we go far towards
so true and profound a conception of the Law as very few
men have analyzed, and as makes us know Right itself, the
real Jus that great scholars of Pennsylvania like Brinton
Coxe, James Parsons, John Cadwalader and William
Tilgham have always held in view. The General Issue sheds
its genial influence upon Retort, and requires judges who
are too busy for the labor to act as moderators in a debating
society whilst a jury idly watches (see Reeves' Hist. of
English Law, II, 219, Finlason, 1869); but this evil was
felt at the beginning of the century in this Commonwealth,
and whilst much remains to be improved, not the less by our
system of affidavit of defence, which is untechnical special
pleading, and of notice of special matter, there is a good
degree of preparation for proofs before the trial court convenes. We should make the affidavit of defence a plea and
by process of demurrer prune it from Retort to Answer.
The General Verdict is without scientific sanction in many
instances, but it is much less dangerous than it was in the
time of Edward the First before Parliament by the Act of
the thirteenth of his reign prohibited the justices from compelling jurors to find a general verdict involving a question
of law, and declared that, should the jurors have the temerity thus to do of their own motion, they were to be regarded
as acting at their own peril. It is safer, perhaps, as more free
from one kind of interference than it was in the day of Shelley, J., who charged the jury as to credibility and weight
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of the evidence, int. al., that men are liars and not angels:
homines sunt mendaces at non angeli. Rolfe v. Hampden,
Dyer, 53 .b. And although to-day it must be conceded that
by it some loss at times is entailed upon corporations defendant in actions of tort, their gain by the doctrine of contributory negligence is at other times perhaps more than the
strictest justice would allow them, and certainly a compensatory circumstance.
The prerogative to direct a special verdict has not often of
late been exercised here, but in actions ex contractuit may in
its exercise go far towards the restoration of the balance of
power between the jury and the judge, although we must not
forget the warning of Brackenridge, justice, in Wilt v.
Franklin, I Binn. 528, that on a special verdict the presumptions and inferences must be drawn by the court. Always,
however, does this caution present itself to us, and particularly in the sphere of the recognition of personal justice, or
the justice of hard cases, when the institution of the jury
may at times appear to be slighted. But there is never a time
when menaces may not be pointed at and feared by certain
observers. And as these three menaces of to-day are found
in branches or accessories, and not in the great system or
trunk itself, we need only say that at the worst some exuberant overgrowth must be lopped off. My intention has been
to describe them as fully as may be, in order to show you two
things, that the science of law in its administration is not in
danger, no matter how strong certain evidences of development which the superficial call innovation, reform, subversion; and that learning has been, is and always will be the
light and help of the law; and that above all the Jus or
Right itself remains unaffected. Learning tempers criticism,
takes the tone of melancholy out of complaint, ends individual arrogance, alone makes for universal right. Learning in
its fullness goes far beyond the stage of complacent disapproval which is a sure sign of weakness. Remember the
great protest of Ben Jonson in his preface to the Alchemist,
and how he closes: "For it is only the disease of the unskillful to think rude things greater than polished, and scattered more numerous than composed." Suppress every sneer
to which your academic success may tempt you, for you
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cannot, if a good scholar, find any feeble proposition without
warrant in some record. That a judgment must not precede
proof is probably the surest affirmation I can recall to you;
you might think you could claim toleration for a sneer at its
converse; and yet in the Anglo-Saxon procedure a judgment
was rendered before the evidence was taken and conclusion
of fact found, a practice not only finding warrant in a record, but warrant in a system of judicature.
Ignorant men may sometimes help you. It is always dangerous, at any rate, to contemn them. But this is because
they put you upon inquiry and thus incite you to delightful
and more careful investigation. It is never to be reasonably
feared that the practice of the law will become vicious, or
even bad, or even hurtful, through ignorance. In the very
nature of the thing the practice cannot be radically wrong.
There may be seasons of decadence. But the use of the intellect with a view to persuading or convincing a court, and
subject not only to the correction of an adversary, but to
the rulings shown by volumes of reports and prescriptions
of statutes which must be obeyed, makes in practice an effective intellectual vice impossible.
William W. Wiltbank.

NoTF--The view expressed in this paper that "the achievement of a
surrejoinderhas for years been absolutely impossible" is not affected by
the recent report of Allen v. The Colliery Engineers' Co., 196 Pa. St. R.
512, in which a series of papers appears to have been filed in the court
below entitled as pleadings up to a demurrer to a surrebutter.

